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bounty of green energy for citizens, is made possible through
the cooperative efforts of citizens, government agencies, private
businesses, not-for-profit entities, and educational institutions.
However, there is often a dearth of cooperation necessary
to produce public goods. For example, many green marketing
initiatives struggle because of insufficient private resource contributions (Wiser & Pickle, 1997). The social dilemma paradigm
maintains that cooperation is challenging when producing public goods because of an inherent tension between satisfying
self-interests and collective interests (Dawes, 1980). Public
goods provision is a type of social dilemma (Messick & Brewer,
1983) or interdependent decision where “individually reasonable behavior leads to a situation in which everyone is worse off
than they might have been otherwise” (Kollock, 1998, p. 183).
When producing public goods, individuals may be motivated
to satisfy their own interests at the expense of the collective’s:
They defect or do not contribute toward the public good (Zeng
& Chen, 2003). Individuals do not contribute either because
they go on the offense (i.e., they free ride and attempt to enjoy
the benefits of the public good without incurring much [or any]
of the cost) or they go on the defense: that is, they anticipate
others are untrustworthy and seek to avoid being “suckered”
(Schnake, 1991; Yamagishi & Sato, 1986). The consequence
of undercontribution, however motivated, is that the collective
incurs the ultimate costs: The public good’s provision is either
slowed or halted.
Two sources of uncertainty encourage undercontribution and
are present when providing many real-world public goods. The
first source is social uncertainty (Sniezek, May, & Sawyer,
1990). This barrier is a function of insufficient information
about whether individuals will contribute toward the public
good (Messick, Allison, & Samuelson, 1988). For instance,
water quality (a public good) suffered in the 1990s in northern Florida primarily from farmers’ lack of certainty about
one another’s willingness to invest in green farming practices
(Lubell, 2004).
The second source of uncertainty is outcome variance. This
is a type of environmental uncertainty—a lack of information

We investigate how third-party advice on the estimated value
of a public good acts as a dual-uncertainty reducing mechanism
to encourage cooperation in a trust social dilemma. Experiment
1 finds that the valence of an advisor’s estimate affects cooperation behavior and that this advice effect is mediated by the level of
trust that an individual has in fellow group members. Experiment
2 finds that when estimates about the value of the public good
are mixed, trust in experts declines, and trust in other group
members also declines. Experiment 3 finds that mixed valence
estimates do not affect cooperation behavior when the majority of advisors are in consensus. In merging the social dilemma
and advice-giving literatures, we show one way to navigate the
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Many of the benefits we enjoy in organizations and society
come in the form of public goods: resources that can be enjoyed
by anyone, irrespective of who helped in their provision and
without diminishing their benefits to others (Olson, 1995). Public
goods are provided by individuals cooperating: They contribute
private resources, incurring short-term costs to generate collective, long-term benefits (Messick & Brewer, 1983). For instance,
the construction of a wind power grid, intended to produce a
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about the value of the public good prior to contributing (van
Dijk, Wilke, Wilke, & Metman, 1999). McCarter and colleagues
(2010) found that outcome variance negatively affects contributions to further a collective interest when there is a potential
for a loss (i.e., loss prospect) in the value of the public good.
Fearing that the value of the public good may not be worth the
aggregated contributions of the group, an individual defensively
does not contribute. To illustrate, the potential wind power grid
in the central United States is anticipated to supply the Midwest
and eastern states with abundant green energy. However, it is
unclear how much energy (if any) would be available—let alone
whether it would be enough to balance the collective costs contributed to construct the grid (Joyce, 2009). Not limited to green
energy, other examples of public goods with outcome variance
include generic advertising (Miller, 1982) and strategic alliance
initiatives (Luo, 2007).
These two uncertainty sources pose a significant problem to
organizations because, in addition to their ubiquity when producing real-world public goods, both encourage independently
an individual’s tendency to satisfy his or her self-interests at the
expense of the collective’s (McCarter et al., 2010). The presence
and independence of social uncertainty and outcome variance
create a need to explore dual-uncertainty reducing mechanisms.
Further, although we know many ways to reduce social uncertainty, the same cannot be said for outcome variance, and
this is despite over a decade of admonition (Gärling, Biel, &
Gustafsson, 1998). We fill these gaps by drawing from a body
of work that has received little attention from social dilemma
scholars: the third-party, advice-giving literature (Bonaccio &
Dalal, 2006).
Drawing from social psychology and decision-making
domains, we submit that the existence of social uncertainty
and outcome variance in public goods dilemmas makes individuals susceptible to informational social influence (Deutsch
& Gerard, 1955). Advice from third-party experts as informational social influence may affect an individual’s perceptions
of the value of the public good and willingness to trust others. The number of advisors and the distribution of outcome
valence estimates may also play a critical role in affecting contribution behavior. A series of laboratory experiments tests our
predictions and simulates the provision of green energy sources
to remain grounded in a real-world context. We preface further discussion with a boundary condition. Because defection
can still abound even after offensive defection is made impossible (Kollock, 1998; Marinoff, 1999), we follow the burgeoning
interest in mitigating defensive defection (McCarter, Mahoney,
& Northcraft, 2011; Rockmann & Northcraft, 2008).
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individual, group, or societal level), and physical characteristics of the shared resource.1 These structural elements impact
the willingness of the decision maker to trust others, and, consequently, affect the likelihood of that individual’s cooperation
(in our case, contribution toward the public good).
Outcome Variance
Embedding the dual-uncertainty problem of public goods
dilemmas into Ostrom’s (2003) model, two elements are germane. The first is the physical characteristics of the shared
resource. Outcome variance in the value of the public good is
a physical characteristic that influences cooperative behavior
(Ostrom, 1990). Compared to when the value of the public good
is known prior to an individual’s contribution, outcome variance
in the value of the public good containing only the prospect of a
gain should have no effect on the likelihood of cooperation (or
contributing to the public good) (van Dijk et al., 1999). However,
when outcome variance contains the prospect of a loss—that is,
the value of the benefit from the public good may be less than my
individual contribution—the likelihood of cooperation declines
(McCarter et al., 2010). As discussed by McCarter et al. (2010),
loss prospects decrease the likelihood of contributing toward a
public good because they decrease an individual’s subjective
expected net benefit from the public good.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES

Trust
The second relevant construct from the Ostrom (2003) model
is trust. Trust is a key motivator for cooperation in public goods
dilemmas (De Cremer, 2007; McCarter & Northcraft, 2007).
Though many conceptualizations of trust exist (for reviews see
Hardin, 2001, 2002; Lewicki, Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006),
the unidimensional psychological approach views trust as an
individual’s “expectations, assumptions or beliefs about the
likelihood that another’s future actions will be beneficial, favorable or at least not detrimental” to them (Robinson, 1996,
p. 576) and views trust and distrust at opposite ends of the
same spectrum (Jones & George, 1998). Inherent to Robinson’s
(1996) definition of trust is the necessity of the presence of
risk and that the trustor is aware of the risk he or she is taking (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). The unidimensional,
psychological approach views trust as having both cognitive
(or calculative) and emotional (or value) elements (McAllister,
1995). For an individual to have trust in another person there
must be the perception of shared expectations and values (Jones
& George, 1998). In relation to social dilemmas, individuals
must mutually hold (and believe others hold) an expectation
of cooperation (the cognitive side of trust) and goodwill (the
emotional side of trust). In such a situation one could cooperate
without fear of being “played the sucker” (Schnake, 1991).2

Public Goods Dilemmas, Outcome Variance, and Trust
Ostrom’s (2003) behavioral model submits that three structural elements influence cooperation in social dilemmas: the
institution (through rules and incentives), cultural norms (at the

Informational Social Influence and Third-Party Advice
Two literatures are germane to this article’s focus on thirdparty advice and their effects on decision making in public
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goods dilemmas with environmental uncertainty: informational
social influence theory and the judge–advisor system paradigm.
Informational Social Influence
Theories of informational social influence maintain that individuals seek and use information provided through their social
environment as cues regarding what to think about and how to
behave in an uncertain situation. Informational social influence
occurs when people “accept information obtained from another
as evidence about reality” (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955, p. 629).
Individuals are particularly susceptible to informational influence when there is environmental uncertainty coupled with the
fear of incurring negative consequences for taking an incorrect
course of action (Festinger, 1954; King, 1975). In such situations, information provided by others focuses an individual’s
attention to specific, important aspects of the situation and as
a consequence influences perceptions of the situation and the
observer’s subsequent behavior (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978).
Research directly examining the effects of social influence
on cooperation behavior in public goods dilemmas is sparse.
Wit and Wilke (1998) draw from normative, social influence
theory to explain people’s cooperation behavior in public goods
dilemmas. The work most closely related to the current research
is from experimental economics. Chaudhuri and colleagues
(2006) examined how advice from progenitors of a public goods
dilemma with respect to the amount to contribute influenced
contribution levels in individuals presently playing a public
goods dilemma with certain value. The Chaudhuri et al. (2006)
paper found that intergenerational advice, when made common
knowledge by being read out loud, increased the level of contribution compared to either when no advice was given, when
advice was given in private, or when advice was shared by
everyone presently playing but not read out loud. Similar to
the Wit and Wilke (1998) paper, Chaudhuri and colleagues’
(2006) work focuses on how norms (concerning the appropriate contribution level) emerge through advice giving. The
current research relaxes the assumption that the public good’s
value is known prior to contributing and, consequently, examines what effect advice about the value of the public good has
on cooperation rates.
Judge–Advisor Systems
The judge–advisor system (JAS) paradigm is based on the
observation that the opinions of others can influence heavily
the formation of our perceptions, attitudes, and choices (Ajzen
& Fishbein, 1980).3 Third-party advisors are often used by
policymakers and managers to assist individuals in making
more effective decisions because it is assumed that these advisors possess information that others (namely, those making the
managerial decision) lack (Harvey, Harriea, & Fischer, 2000).
When advice is provided by a third party, the receiver of that
advice is the final “judge” or decision maker. The information
from the third-party advisor is considered by the judge to make
a more accurate assessment of the “correct” state of the world

(Yaniv, 2004). Advice provided by these third parties constitutes
a form of informational social influence (Messick & Ohme,
1988) since the receiver believes that the advisor has a more
complete picture of the situation and that using the advice will
aid in making the “right” decision (Insko, Sedlack, & Lipsitz,
1982).
There are innumerable situations in which individual decision makers (judges) receive guidance from external experts
(advisors). These situations typically fall into one of three
broad categories: dependent, independent, and cued (Sniezek &
Buckley, 1995). Dependent judges have no basis for generating
choices without the input of advisors and are forced to rely on
their advisors heavily. Independent judges have informational
resources of their own and form a tentative judgment before
hearing what the experts have to say. Cued judges differ from
independent judges in that they are exposed to the advice of
experts before generating their own judgments (Ronis & Yeats,
1987). Cued judges are, perhaps, the most common naturally
occurring of the three and represent situations where decision
makers have not already come to a firm judgment before being
exposed to the advice of others. For example, if legislators considering green energy initiatives were at least somewhat well
informed on the issue but solicited the expert input of, say,
an energy committee prior to coming to any conclusions of
their own, then this would be considered a cued judge–advisor
relationship.

Hypotheses
In public goods dilemmas, third-party advice about the value
of the public good can serve two purposes. The first purpose is
that third-party advice can reduce uncertainty about the value of
the public good. Returning to our earlier wind power example,
policymakers are uncertain as to the benefits of such an initiative
and, to reduce that uncertainty, turn to third-party advisors such
as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for estimates
about the possible value of this public good (Blackwell, 2010).
The possibility that a new wind power grid could produce little
or no energy leaves potential contributors open to informational
social influence from third-party advisors.
Second, reinforcement-affect theory suggests that the level
of trust one individual has in his or her group members may
be a function of the information valence received from the
third-party advisor (Byrne, 1971). Individuals who experience
independently a positive external stimulus (positive information about the value of the public good) are more likely to
view associated others (even complete strangers) more positively and as more trustworthy (Byrne & Clore, 1970; Veitch
& Griffitt, 1976). When the advice from a third-party expert
is favorable (i.e., the value of the public good will be worth
more than the combined contributions of the group) and is common knowledge among decision makers, an individual’s fear
of incurring a loss is reduced and the individual’s trust in others is increased. As a consequence, we predict that individuals
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receiving favorable third-party advice will be more likely to
contribute toward a public good than will those not receiving
such advice. However, when the situation is reversed and the
advice from the third-party expert is unfavorable (i.e., the value
of the public good will be worth less than the combined contributions of the group), individuals’ fear of incurring a loss
increases. Therefore, such individuals will be more likely to
conclude that their fellow group members are also fearful of
incurring a loss, and, as a consequence, will be less trusting that
their group members will contribute toward the public good.
Because of this decrease in trust, these individuals will be less
likely to contribute toward a public good compared to when
no advice is provided. This theorizing leads to the following
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1a: An individual will be more likely to cooperate
(i.e., contribute toward the public good) when the advice
from the expert is favorable, compared to when no advice
is given.
Hypothesis 1b: An individual will be less likely to cooperate
(i.e., contribute toward the public good) when the advice
from the expert is unfavorable, compared to when no advice
is given.
Hypothesis 2a: An individual’s trust that his or her group members will cooperate will increase when the advice from the
expert is favorable, compared to when no advice is given.
Hypothesis 2b: An individual’s trust that his or her group members will cooperate will decrease when the advice from the
expert is unfavorable, compared to when no advice is given.
Hypothesis 3: Trust will mediate the relationship between favorable advice from a third-party expert and an individual’s
likelihood of cooperating.
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS
To test and extend the preceding hypotheses, we use a series
of laboratory experiments. Laboratory experiments provide
high internal validity and psychological realism whereby we
can isolate the relationship between perceptions (i.e., trust) and
actual behavior (e.g., cooperation) (Colquitt, 2008; Creswell,
2003). The paradigm the current experiments utilize is an assurance dilemma paradigm (Sen, 1985)—also called a trust social
dilemma or stag-hunt game (Liebrand, 1983; Skyrms, 2004).4
The assurance dilemma models public goods problems yet differs from the often utilized prisoners’ dilemma in that offensive
non-prosocial behavior (i.e., free riding) is impossible, leaving defensive, non-prosocial behavior as the only means of
hindering public good provision (Kollock, 1998). There are several benefits from using the assurance social dilemma. First,
as observed by Kollock (1998) and Skyrms (2004), the structure of the assurance public goods dilemma isolates trust as the
psychological explanatory variable for a group’s deviation from
cooperation. Even through incentives are aligned in the assurance public goods dilemma to encourage mutual cooperation,
each individual must trust that other parties share his or her
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expectations and values. An individual must expect the others
to cooperate and not want to incur “pleasure from being nasty”
by defecting (Abbink & Sadrieh, 2009, p. 306). Further, assurance public goods are common in organizational life. Strategic
supply chains that reduce their supply base (making each partner indispensable) and the assembly of land parcels to enhance
societal welfare with the creation of renewable energy grids are
but two examples of assurance public goods dilemmas where
the value of cooperation is uncertain and the providers often
turn to outside advice for counsel (Joyce, 2009; McCarter &
Northcraft, 2007).
Experiment 1 tests the hypotheses already presented.
To enhance external validity (Rosenthal, 1990), the subsequent
experiments replicate one another and extend the core model.
Experiment 2 replicates and extends Experiment 1 by also
examining how mixed estimates (i.e., receiving favorable and
unfavorable estimates from two independent advisors) influence
cooperation. Experiment 3 replicates and builds on Experiment
2 by increasing the number of independent advisors to four and
investigates how different distributions of advice valence (e.g.,
one favorable estimate with three unfavorable estimates) affect
cooperation behavior. In this way, external validity is increased
through “generalization” with different populations and “exact
replication” across experiments (Tsang & Kwan, 1999).

EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Sample and Design
One hundred and twenty-seven students enrolled in business
courses at a university in the western United States participated
in this experiment for course credit. Experiment 1 investigates
the influence of advice (and its valence) on contribution behavior. To this end, this experiment used an unbalanced withinsubjects design in which the first factor involved three outcome
variance conditions (no outcome variance, outcome variance
with only gain prospects, and outcome variance with gain and
loss prospects) and the second factor involved two advice conditions (i.e., positive advice, negative advice). The second factor
was crossed with the last condition of the outcome variance
factor because we are primarily interested in defensive nonprosocial behavior when facing uncertainty with loss prospects.
All advice, when provided, occurred when the value of the public good was uncertain and contained a gain and loss prospect.
Task and Procedure
Participants completed this experiment via computer. This
allowed all decisions to be made anonymously and privately.
Upon registering for the experiment, participants were directed
to instructions for a series of five independent resource allocation decisions. These resource allocation decisions were presented in a preselected random order. Each decision in this
experiment involved a public goods assurance dilemma with
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three players. In each resource allocation decision, participants
were asked to imagine themselves in the role of a property
owner who, with two other individuals, had to decide whether to
transfer his or her property rights to a firm for the development
of a green energy power plant or retain them for private development. The firm and power plant were respectively paired in
each resource allocation decision. If not, then whoever retained
their property rights for private development would receive
200 game dollars and whoever gave their property rights to the
firm received nothing.
Participants were informed that at the end of the experiment each of their choices would be randomly combined with
the choices of two other participants for each resource allocation decision, and that each participant would be combined
with the same group only once. Neither communication nor
contact among the participants was permitted, and additional
information about the behavior of other participants or their
demographics was not provided. After reading the instructions,
the participants completed a quiz to assess their understanding of the nature of the resource allocations decisions being
made. Once they completed the quiz, participants made the
five resource allocations at their own pace, and answered several questions about the game after each resource allocation
decision.
Manipulations
Consistent with previous research, outcome variance was
manipulated by placing a uniform distribution around the value
of the public good. Following McCarter and colleagues (2010),
the expected value of the public good remained constant in each
outcome variance condition, while the upper and lower bounds
of the distribution varied to create either a gain-only prospect
or a gains-and-loss prospect. The three outcome variance conditions, given three-person groups, were as follows.
– No variance condition: The value of the public good, if
provided, would be $1350 ($450 per property owner).
– Uncertain, gains-only prospect condition: The value of
the public good, if provided, would be any value between
$900 and $1800 (between $300 and $600 per property
owner).
– Uncertain, gains-and-loss prospect condition: The value of
the public good, if provided, would be any value between
$0 and $2700 (between $0 and $900 per property owner).
Thus, based on these three conditions, any time the value of the
public good, once produced, falls below $200 for an individual
property owner (or below $600 in total value in a three-person
group), individuals contributing their property rights would
incur a loss. The individual incurs a loss because the value of
the public good is less compared to if that individual had kept
his or her property rights and the sure amount of $200.
Our third-party advice manipulation had three conditions.
In the control condition, no advice was provided, leaving
the participants to face a generic three-player public goods

assurance dilemma. In the advice conditions, participants were
informed that an individual in a previous session with a PhD
and expertise in statistics and estimation methods was provided
with additional information about the potential value of the public good and made a prediction based on this information (i.e.,
the advice offered to the participant). In the favorable condition,
the expert believed that the value of the public good would be
a total of $1800 ($600 per property owner). In the unfavorable
condition, the expert believed that the value of the public good
would be a total of $21 ($7 per property owner).
In each circumstance when advice was provided, participants
were informed that the expert was not the same person who provided (or would provide) the estimate about the value of the
public good. Having independence among advisors within and
across the conditions accomplishes two things. First, independence among advisors prevents participants from experiencing
impression effects from repeated interaction with the advisor (Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Second, previous research
has found that, controlling for the number of opinions, similar opinions from perceived independent individuals are given
more credibility (and as a consequence provide stronger social
influences) compared to similar opinions from a group of interdependent individuals (Wilder, 1977). Therefore, this approach
facilitates the effective manipulation of informational social
influence.

Behavioral and Survey Measures
The behavioral variable of interest in this study was whether
an individual behaved prosocially (and contributed their property rights) or non-prosocially (and kept their property rights
for private development). This variable is a binary decision: 1 =
behave prosocially and 0 = behave non-prosocially.
Trust in whether an individual’s fellow group members
would contribute their property rights was measured using a 4item scale adapted from Robinson (1996). These items were “I
fully trust both of the other landowners in my group to allocate
their property rights to [the respective firm],” “I believe both of
the other players in my group have high integrity,” “I believe
both of the other landowners in my group have good motives
and intentions,” and “I think both of the other landowners in
my group will treat me fairly by allocating their property rights
to [the respective firm]” (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly
agree). The trust scale demonstrated high internal consistency:
α = .84. To assess an individual’s fear of incurring a loss even
if the public good was provided, we adapted a single item question from McCarter et al. (2010) and asked, “If you and other
landowners in your group allocated your property rights to [the
respective firm] how concerned would you be about incurring a
loss?” (1 = not at all concerned, 6 = very concerned). Because
personal interest or liking toward a “green” cause may influence an individual’s willingness to contribute resources toward
it, a single-item question asking, “In general, how important do
you believe is the development of [the respective green-energy
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source]?” (1 = not at all, 6 = very much) was used as a control
variable.

Results
The control variable measuring the perceived importance of
the development of a respective green energy source did not significantly affect any of the primary results in the current experiment and was excluded from further consideration. The withinsubjects design and dichotomous nature of the main dependent
variable (i.e., contribution toward the public good) required that
we utilize a Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) approach.
This statistical technique provides output similar to logistic
regression and a Wald χ 2 test statistic (Ballinger, 2004). Prior to
testing our hypotheses, the proportion of cooperators and fear of
incurring a loss in each outcome variance condition in which no
advice was provided was compared to assure successful replication of previous findings. Panel A in Table 1 provides the
means and standard deviations of these conditions. As shown
in the table, comparing the combined proportions of the two
gains-only prospect conditions to the loss-and-gain prospect
condition, the proportion of contributors toward the public
good only significantly differed between the losses-and-gains
prospect condition compared to the two gains-only prospect
conditions (M = 78%, SD = 0.42); χ 2 1 = 11.47, p < .001.
Using a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), a
Helmert test found that an individual’s fear of incurring a loss
was significantly greater in the gain-and-loss prospect condition (M = 4.02, SD = 1.31) compared to the combined means
of the uncertain, gains-only and certain prospects conditions
(M = 3.73, SD = 1.45); F 1, 126 = 6.49, p = .012. There
was no significant difference in fear of occurring a loss when

comparing the uncertain, gains-only prospects condition to the
certain prospects condition; F 1, 126 < 0.30, n.s. These findings
are consistent with past research (McCarter et al., 2010).
Panel B in Table 1 displays the mean cooperation rates
and trust levels across conditions. Hypothesis 1a predicts that
individuals will be more likely to cooperate and contribute
toward the public good when the advice from the expert is
favorable, compared to when no advice is given. Consistent
with this prediction, individuals were more likely to contribute
toward the public good when positive advice was provided compared to when no advice was provided; χ 2 1 = 20.42, p <
.001. Hypothesis 1b predicts that individuals are less likely to
contribute toward the public good when the advice from the
expert is unfavorable, compared to when no advice is given.
As posited, individuals were less likely to contribute toward the
public good when negative advice was provided compared to
when no advice was provided; χ 2 1 = 5.09, p = .024.
Hypotheses 2a and 2b maintained that the valence of the
advisor’s estimate would affect the level of trust perceived by
group members: A positive outcome estimate would increase
trust (H2a) and a negative outcome estimate would decrease
trust (H2b) as compared to there being no advice provided.
As predicted, an analysis utilizing a repeated-measures ANOVA
found trust to be significantly higher when advice was favorable
compared to when no advice was provided; F 1, 126 = 23.32,
p < .001, and trust was lower when advice was unfavorable
compared to when no advice was provided; F 1, 126 = 8.32, p =
.004. Hypotheses 2a and 2b were supported.
Hypothesis 3 posits that an individual’s trust in his or her
group members would mediate the relationship between an
expert’s advice valence and that individuals’ willingness to
allocate his or her property rights toward a green initiative.

TABLE 1
Mean cooperation rates by condition in Experiment 1
Panel A: Mean cooperation rates and fear of incurring a loss in Experiment 1 (replication of McCarter
et al., 2010)
Outcome prospects
Variable

No variance

Gains-only

Losses-and-gains

Cooperation rates
Fear of incurring a loss

0.80 (0.40)
3.76 (1.46)

0.75 (0.44)
3.70 (1.43)

0.61 (0.49)
4.02 (1.31)

Panel B: Mean cooperation rates and trust by advice-giving treatment
Advice valence
Variable

No advice

Favorable advice

Unfavorable advice

Cooperation rates
Trust (in group members)

0.61 (0.49)
3.57 (0.99)

0.87 (0.34)
3.96 (1.01)

0.46 (0.50)
3.32 (1.06)

Note. Standard errors in parentheses. For Panel B, all conditions involve outcome variance with losses-and-gains
prospects.
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To test this hypothesis, the necessary procedures for testing
mediation outlined by Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger (1998) were
employed. In step 1 the effects of the valence of an advisor’s
outcome estimate were examined related to the level of trust
(Hypothesis 2a and 2b satisfy this step). In step 2 a GEE
found a significant, positive relationship between trust and
the likelihood of cooperation; χ 2 1 = 51.77, p < .001. Lastly,
a Sobel test found complete mediation by trust between the
valence of the advice and the likelihood of cooperation: advice
with positive outcome valence, z = 2.54, p = .007, and advice
with negative outcome valence, z = –2.17, p = .015, supporting
our prediction.
Discussion
We found support for all of the current experiment’s
hypotheses. An individual’s likelihood of contributing toward
a public good with outcome variance was affected by the
advice provided to him or her by a third-party advisor. Trust
in whether other group members would contribute toward the
public good was found to mediate the relationship between
third-party advice and contribution behavior. It was also found
that fear of incurring a loss decreased when advice from the
third-party expert was favorable.
Experiment 2 examines how cooperation behavior may
change when two advisors provide either unanimous or conflicting estimates about the value of the public good. This
is an important extension for several reasons. First, in the
theoretical sense, understanding how conflicting information
from third-party advisors in a small-group situation like ours
pushes our understanding about the boundaries of informational
social influence affects on intergroup relations. Second, in the
managerial sense, advice is often acquired from multiple
sources of information and these sources of information may
contradict.
EXPERIMENT 2
It is often the case that decisions are made based on
advice from multiple advisors (Yaniv & Milyavsky, 2007), and
such advisors may have different preferences about a course
of action. For decades, the divergence of expert advice has
been found in a variety of organizational contexts such as
medical diagnoses (Einhorn, 1974), auditing financial reports
(Kida, 1980), and, more recently, green energy initiatives
(Mieszkowski, 2006). Given the ubiquitous nature of conflicting input, we argue that understanding the effects of multiple
advisors is important to advancing our understanding of how
judges make decisions in public good dilemmas.
Trusting an advisor’s estimate is a critical determinant for
whether an individual uses the advice (Sniezek & Van Swol,
2001). Receivers of mixed information often discount the information altogether and do not trust the sources of the information. This discounting may be a defensive strategy because the
nonexpert cannot evaluate the relative merits of the different

sources of advice (Shanteau, 2001). Thus, we predict that
receiving mixed estimates from two advisors about the potential
value of a public good will have a negative effect on the likelihood of an individual cooperating as compared to when two
advisors both give favorable estimates. Receiving mixed estimates, an individual is likely to have low trust in both experts’
estimates and discount both estimates. Having low trust in the
estimates, an individual remains uncertain about the value of the
public good.
When experiencing this uncertainty about the value of the
public good, individuals may also experience low trust in their
group members. Research on uncertainty and emotions suggests
that when individuals face uncertainty about the benefits they
will receive from participating in a given situation, they experience negative emotions about, and distrust in, those involved
in the situation (Kiefer, 2005). This finding is complimentary
to reinforcement-affect theory (e.g., Byrne & Clore, 1970):
Feeling negative emotions about a situation leads individuals to perceive those associated with the situation (e.g., their
group members and the experts giving the information) negatively (e.g., not to trust them). Experiencing low trust and
fearing a potential loss, the individual will be more likely not
to contribute toward the public good.
Hypothesis 4: Individuals who receive mixed valence estimates
from third-party experts will be less likely to contribute
toward the public good compared to when both third-party
estimates are favorable.
Hypothesis 5: An individual’s trust in the experts’ advice will
be low when the valence estimates from third-party experts
are mixed compared to when both third-party estimates are
favorable.
Hypothesis 6: An individual’s trust that his or her group members will cooperate will mediate the relationship between
the distribution of valence estimates and the likelihood of
contributing toward the public good.
Hypothesis 7: An individual’s trust in the experts’ advice
will mediate the relationship between the distributions of
valence estimates and trust that his or her group members
will cooperate.
Method
Sample
Ninety-four students at a university (different from the one
in Experiment 1) in the western United States participated in
this experiment for payment. Demographic information about
the sample was gathered and showed that 48% of the sample
was male, the average age was 20 years, and the average work
experience was 2.6 years.
Task and Procedure
The procedures for this experiment were identical to those
in Experiment 1, with the addition of three advisor conditions. To avoid the potential issue of mixed-gender effects in
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groups, all sessions involved individuals of the same gender.
Also, the different resource allocation decisions were blocked
by advice condition (i.e., no advice provided, one advisor,
and two advisors) and within these blocks the treatments were
ordered using a Latin square design, allowing us to control
for order effects. Participants received a US$7 show-up fee
and were informed that at the end of the session one game
would be selected and played for real money at the conversion rate of 2c/ = 1 game dollar earned. The participants did
not know which resource allocation decision was selected until
the end of the session. Upon the participants completing their
decisions, a game was selected from the session, a value randomly chosen, and the subjects were paid accordingly and
dismissed.
Additional Treatments
Three additional advice treatments were presented in this
experiment. Each treatment involved two advisors providing
estimates about the value of the public good, and these three
treatments varied as to whether the valence of the advisors’
estimates agreed or disagreed.
– Two favorable estimates: Two advisors provided favorable
estimates about the value of the public good; that is, Expert
1 estimated the value of the public good would be $1575
($525 per property owner) and Expert 2’s estimate was
$1890 ($630 per property owner).
– Two unfavorable estimates: Two advisors provided unfavorable estimates about the value of the public good; that is,
Expert 1 estimated the value of the public good would be
$90 ($30 per property owner) and Expert 2’s estimate was
$15 ($5 per property owner).
– Mixed estimates: The two advisors provided valence conflicting estimates about the value of the public good; that is,
Expert 1 estimated the value of the public good would be
$66 ($22 per property owner—an unfavorable estimate) and
Expert 2’s estimate was $1875 ($625 per property owner—a
favorable estimate).
The two unfavorable estimates condition was necessary to
assure that trust in the advisor’s estimates was only a function
of mixed advice and not the valence of the advice.
Measures
Because some participants received mixed advice from advisors, we asked several questions to assess how different distributions of advice valence affected participants’ perceptions
of the advisors. To assess how much an individual trusted an
expert’s estimation, a one-item measure asked, “How much did
you trust your Expert’s estimation?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very
much). All remaining measures were identical to those used in
the previous experiment. Questions about trust in advice and
consideration of advice were asked separately for each advisor
when two advisors were present. The trust scale (in fellow group
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members) showed high internal consistency: α = .80. In addition to an individual’s perceived importance of supporting green
initiatives, we used gender as a control variable.
Results
The control variables gender and perceived importance of
green initiatives had no significant effect on the primary results
of this experiment. We also successfully replicated all findings
in Experiment 1.5
Hypothesis Testing
Table 2 provides the mean cooperation rates and trust levels
for group members and advisors for Experiment 2. Hypothesis
4 posits that when the estimate of the outcome is mixed, individuals would be less likely to contribute than when both advisors
gave favorable estimates. GEE revealed that contribution rates
were significantly less when advisors provided mixed outcome valence estimates compared to when both estimates were
favorable; χ 2 1 = 31.76, p < .001, supporting Hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 5 predicts that an individual’s trust in the experts’
advice will be low when the valence estimates from experts are
mixed compared to when both third-party estimates are favorable. Because our item measuring trust in Expert 1’s estimate
significantly correlated with trust in Expert 2’s estimate (r =
0.74, p < .001), both items were averaged to produce one
score of trust in the paired experts’ estimates. In support of
Hypothesis 5, a repeated-measures ANOVA found that trust in
both experts’ estimates was significantly lower when advisors
provided mixed outcome valence estimates compared to when
both estimates were favorable; F 1, 93 = 84.47, p < .001.
Hypothesis 6 posits that an individual’s trust in their group
members’ willingness to cooperate mediates the relationship
between the distribution of valence estimates and the likelihood
of contributing toward the public good. Following the method
of Kenny and colleagues (1998), trust in fellow group members
was found to significantly mediate the relationship between the
distribution of valence estimates and the likelihood of contributing toward the public good; z = –3.77, p = .001. This finding
supports Hypothesis 6.
Hypothesis 7 stated that an individual’s trust in the experts’
advice mediates the relationship between the distribution of
valence estimates and trust that their group members. A mediation analysis found support for Hypothesis 7: An individual’s
trust in the experts’ advice mediated the relationship between
the distribution of valence estimates and trust that their group
members would cooperate; z = 5.58, p < .001 (Kenny et al.,
1998).
Post Hoc Analysis
Supplemental analysis involved probing the possibility of
different reasons for defection in the conditions with two advisors and examining differences in cooperation rates as a function of advice distribution. Using a Bonferroni adjusted α =
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TABLE 2
Mean cooperation rates and trust in Experiment 2
Advice valence and distribution
Variable

No advice

Uniform favorable
advice

Uniform unfavorable
advice

Mixed advice

Cooperation rates
Trust (in group members)
Trust (in experts)

0.67 (0.47)
3.98 (1.00)
—

0.95 (0.23)
4.51 (1.01)
4.55 (1.13)

0.13 (0.34)
3.40 (1.13)
4.13 (1.52)

0.51 (0.50)
3.77 (1.02)
3.48 (1.11)

Note. All conditions involve outcome variance with losses-and-gains prospects. Standard errors in parentheses.

.006, a repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that trust in fellow group members was lessened when both experts provided
unfavorable advice (M = 3.40, SD = 1.13) compared to when
no advice was provided (M = 3.98, SD = 1.00); F 1,93 = 32.16,
p < .006, and that trust in fellow group members increased
when both experts provide favorable advice (M = 4.51, SD =
1.01) compared to when no advice was provided (M = 3.98);
F 1,93 = 35.24, p < .006. Also there was significantly less trust in
group members when both experts gave unfavorable estimates
compared to when the estimates were both favorable; F 1, 93 =
104.34, p < .006. Trust in fellow group members was critical of whether individuals decided to cooperate in the various
two-advisor conditions. However, this was not the case for an
individual’s trust in the advisors’ estimates. Trust in the advisors’ estimates did not significantly change when comparing
dual unfavorable advice (M = 4.13, SD = 1.52) and dual favorable advice conditions (M = 4.54, SD = 1.13); F 1, 93 = 6.30,
n.s., but did significantly change in the mixed-estimate advisor condition (M = 3.48, SD = 1.10); F 1, 93 = 58.86, p <
.006 (Helmert test). These analyses of the changes in trust in
advisors’ estimates and in fellow group members suggest that
trust in group members influenced cooperation behavior in all
dual-advisor conditions, but trust in the advisors’ estimates also
influenced cooperation behavior in the mixed estimate advisor
condition.
Our finding that mixed advice decreased participants’ trust in
the advisors (and group members) led us to speculate that mixed
advice would further lead to decreased cooperation compared to
our control condition where no advice was given. As shown in
Table 2, individuals were more likely to contribute toward the
public good when no advice was provided compared to when
mixed advice was provided; χ 2 1 = 4.90, p = .027.

Discussion
This experiment found support for the posited hypotheses.
Receiving mixed estimates about the value of the public good
from two advisors can impede the public good’s provision.
However, supplemental analysis suggests that there are different psychological mechanisms that influence cooperation when
advisor estimates are unanimous compared to when they are

mixed. When estimates about the value of the public good are
unanimous (i.e., both favorable or both unfavorable), trust in fellow group members drives cooperation decisions whereas trust
in the expert’s estimates does not change. One explanation is
that when advice is consistent, participants trust the advisors’
estimates, whether those estimates are favorable or unfavorable. However, although group-member trust is also important
when advice is mixed, trust in the advisors’ estimates also
plays a significant role. Mixed estimates lead an individual
to trust neither advisor’s estimate, and this decline in advisor
trust decreases trust that fellow group members will contribute
toward the public good. Further, these perceptions mirror contribution behavior: Participants receiving mixed advice were less
likely to contribute to the public good compared to when no
advice was given.
In the current experiment, the mixed condition had a disagreement rate of 50%: One advisor provided a favorable
estimate and the other gave an unfavorable estimate. From this,
we cannot speak to situations involving more advisors such that
a majority could give estimates of one valence (e.g., favorable)
whereas a minority provides an estimate of the opposite valence
(e.g., unfavorable). We address this question in the third experiment of the current research, drawing from the advice-taking
literature on outlying opinions. Also, our post hoc finding that
mixed advice created less cooperation compared to there being
no advice was unanticipated.

EXPERIMENT 3
In this third experiment, we explore the mixed-estimate finding of Experiment 2 further by examining mixed-estimates
coming from a group of four advisors. The presence of four
advisors provides the opportunity to examine a wider distribution of advice valence such as a 25% unfavorable/75%
favorable split, as well as unanimous estimate valence (100%
unfavorable), as well as estimates balanced in valence (50%
favorable vs. 50% unfavorable). Although previous work on
advice taking suggests that receiving mixed estimates may
result in a loss of trust in the advisors (Shanteau, 2001), recent
research also finds that individuals discount an advisor’s estimate when the advisor is in the minority. Specifically, Harries
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and colleagues (2004) investigated the case in which four advisor estimates about a particular question were obtained (e.g.,
In what year was [a particular city] founded?) such that three
advisors were very close to each other in terms of their estimates and the remaining advisor was an outlier. They found
that individuals discounted outliers and, because of simplicity
of the strategy, made their estimates by taking the median of
the three remaining decisions. In short, it may be that it is not
the presence of disagreement in estimate valence that decreases
cooperation via losing trust in the advisors, but rather it may
be necessary for there to be a significant portion of disagreement before trust in the advisors declines. Extending Harries
and colleagues’ previous findings, we make the following
predictions.

(described in the next subsection). As with Experiment 2, the
different resource allocation decisions were blocked by advice
condition (i.e., no advice provided, one advisor, two advisors,
and—in the case of the current experiment—four advisors) and
the treatments within these blocks were ordered in a Latin
square design.

Hypothesis 8a: An individual will be more likely to cooperate
when the individual receives at least 75% favorable estimates from advisors compared to when the individual does
not.
Hypothesis 8b: An individual will be more likely to defect when
the individual receives at least 75% unfavorable estimates
from advisors compared to when the individual does not.

– Four favorable estimates: The four advisors all provided
favorable estimates about the value of the public good; that
is, Expert 1 estimated the value of the public good would be
$1200 ($400 per property owner), Expert 2’s estimate was
$1449 revenue dollars ($483 per property owner), Expert
3’s estimate was $1236 revenue dollars ($412 per property
owner), and Expert 4’s estimate was $1527 revenue dollars
($509 per property owner).
– Four unfavorable estimates: All four advisors provided
unfavorable estimates about the value of the public good; that
is, Expert 1 estimated the value of the public good would
be $21 ($7 per property owner), Expert 2’s estimate was
$30 revenue dollars ($10 per property owner), Expert 3’s
estimate was $18 revenue dollars ($6 per property owner),
and Expert 4’s estimate was $27 revenue dollars ($9 per
property owner).
– One favorable and three unfavorable: One advisor provided
a favorable estimate and the remaining advisors gave unfavorable estimates about the value of the public good; that is,
Expert 1 estimated the value of the public good would be
$1824 ($608 per property owner), Expert 2’s estimate was
$72 revenue dollars ($24 per property owner), Expert 3’s
estimate was $99 revenue dollars ($33 per property owner),
and Expert 4’s estimate was $66 revenue dollars ($22 per
property owner).
– One unfavorable and three favorable: One advisor provided
an unfavorable estimate and the remaining advisors gave
favorable estimates about the value of the public good; that
is, Expert 1 estimated the value of the public good would
be $33 ($11 per property owner), Expert 2’s estimate was
$1800 revenue dollars ($600 per property owner), Expert
3’s estimate was $1500 revenue dollars ($500 per property
owner), and Expert 4’s estimate was $1740 revenue dollars
($580 per property owner).
– Two unfavorable and two favorable: Two advisors provided
an unfavorable estimate and the other two advisors gave
favorable estimates about the value of the public good; that
is, Expert 1 estimated the value of the public good would be
$1650 ($550 per property owner), Expert 2’s estimate was
$48 revenue dollars ($16 per property owner), Expert 3’s

Experiment 2 found that individuals facing balanced
advisors—that is, one advisor is predicting the value of the
public good to be positive and the other is predicting it to be
negative—are less likely to contribute toward the public good
than if no advice had been given. As suggested by Brown
and colleagues’ (1988) research on information signaling in
markets, evenly split advice from advisors creates additional
uncertainty that is added to the existing uncertainty experienced
by the individual debating whether to contribute to public good
with a loss prospect. Adding additional layers of uncertainty
has been found to decrease cooperation in social dilemmas—
such as contributing toward public goods (Beil & Gärling,
1995). This increase of uncertainty may increase an individual’s
tendency not to contribute toward the public good.
Hypothesis 9: An individual will be less likely to cooperate
when the individual receives perfectly mixed estimates
from advisors compared to when the individual receives no
advice.
Method
Sample
Eighty-nine students at a university (same as the one in
Experiment 2) in the western United States participated in this
experiment for payment. The average age was 20 years, 51%
were male, and the average work experience was 3.2 years.
Task and Procedures
The task and procedures (i.e., payment method and session
procedures) for the current experiment were identical to those
in Experiment 2 of the current research with the exception of
our use of four-person advisory conditions with five treatments

Additional Treatments
The additional condition involved providing participants
with four estimates about the value of the public good, each
coming from an independent advisor. The five treatments within
the new condition varied as to whether the valence of the
advisors’ estimates agreed or disagreed. Specifically:
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estimate was $54 revenue dollars ($18 per property owner),
and Expert 4’s estimate was $1749 revenue dollars ($583 per
property owner).
In the outlier conditions, we followed Harries and colleagues
(2004, p. 338) by preparing the materials such that the outlier
estimate had a z-score greater than 2.0 and all other estimates
have z-scores less than 2.0.
Measures
All measures were identical to the previous experiment with
two exceptions. Questions about trust in advice were asked four
times in conditions with four advisors. The Cronbach’s alpha
for the trust (in fellow group members) scale was α = .79.

Results
The control variables gender and perceived importance of
green initiatives had no significant effect on the primary results
of the current experiment. We successfully replicated all findings from Experiment 2.6
Hypothesis Testing
Table 3 provides the mean cooperation rates and trust levels
across conditions. Hypothesis 8a predicted that an individual
would be more likely to cooperate when the individual receives
75% or more favorable estimates from advisors compared to
when the individual does not, and Hypothesis 8b maintained
that an individual would be more likely to defect when the
individual receives 75% or more unfavorable estimates from
advisors compared to when the individual does not. Using the
unanimous favorable condition as the reference category, a GEE
found that cooperation did not significantly change when three
advisors gave favorable estimates: χ 2 1 = 0.01, n.s., but did
significantly decrease when only two advisors’ estimates were
favorable: χ 2 1 = 28.99, p < .001; when only one advisor’s
estimate was favorable: χ 2 1 = 60.83, p < .001; and when no
advisors’ estimates were favorable; χ 2 1 = 54.22, p < .001.
Lastly, there was no significant difference in cooperation rates
when comparing three unfavorable advisors to four unfavorable
advisors conditions; χ 2 1 = 0.15, n.s. These findings support
Hypotheses 8a and 8b.
Hypothesis 9 maintained that individuals would be less likely
to cooperate when receiving perfectly mixed advice (50% favorable vs. 50 unfavorable) compared to when they received no
advice about the value of the public good. Merging the two perfectly split conditions, GEE found that balanced mixed advice
significantly decreased cooperation; χ 2 1 = 4.78, p = .029.
Comparing each perfectly split condition independently to the
control condition yielded results consistent with this omnibus
finding; two-advisor condition (χ 2 1 = 4.08, p = .043) and
four-advisor condition (χ 2 1 = 3.74, p = .053).

Post Hoc Analyses
To examine further why individuals cooperated, we analyzed the participants’ trust in their individual advisors and
fellow group members. The descriptive statistics for these trust
measures are provided in Table 4, and the following supplemental analysis used a Bonferroni adjusted α = .004. From
Panel A, it can be seen that trust in an individual advisor’s
estimate depends on how their estimate compares to the other
advisors’ estimates. Specifically, individuals trust an outlying
advisor significantly less than those whose estimates are in consensus. Also, it may be observed that the mean level of trust in
agreeing advisors is significantly less when those advisors are
balanced (i.e., 50% favorable vs. 50% unfavorable) compared to
when there is an outlying estimate. When comparing agreeing
advisors in the two-unfavorable-versus-two-favorable condition to the respective three-(un)favorable-versus-one-favorable
(unfavorable) condition, a repeated-measures ANOVA found a
significant difference in trust in advisor estimates: Participants
trusted the agreeing advisors with favorable estimates less in
the two-unfavorable-versus-two-favorable condition compared
to the agreeing advisors in the three-favorable-versus-oneunfavorable condition; F 1, 88 = 50.14, p < .004; and participants
trusted the agreeing advisors with unfavorable estimates less in
the two-unfavorable-versus-two-favorable condition compared
to the agreeing advisors in the three-unfavorable-versus-onefavorable condition; F 1, 88 = 25.30, p < .004.
We examined next how trust in fellow group members
changed as a function of the distribution of estimation valence.
From Panel B, we see that trust in fellow group members does
not change when comparing advisory groups with complete
consensus for either 100% unfavorable or 100% favorable estimates as compared to when there is an outlier present (i.e., when
either 75% unfavorable or 75% favorable; both F’s1, 88 < 2.12,
both p’s n.s.). However, trust in group members was significantly different in the balanced advice condition compared to
the complete consensus and outlier conditions of either valence;
both F’s1, 88 > 14.90, both p’s < .004 (both Helmert tests).
Discussion
This experiment investigated how different distributions of
estimation valence affected cooperation in public goods dilemmas. We found that trust in the advisors’ estimates changed as
a function of how many advisors within a group agreed concerning whether the public good’s value would be favorable or
unfavorable. Lastly, regardless of the number of advisors, when
the advisors were balanced about the valence of the public good,
individuals were less likely to cooperate compared to when no
advice was provided.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In many real-world public good dilemmas, the value of the
public good is not known a priori to individuals contributing
their resources. When outcome variance in the value of the
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TABLE 3
Mean cooperation rates in Experiment 3
Advice valence and distribution
Number of advisors
2
4

Uniform
favorable advice

3 vs.
1 Positive

Mixed
advice

3 vs.
1 Negative

Uniform
unfavorable advice

.96 (.21)
.93 (.25)

—
.93 (.25)

.53 (.50)
.52 (.50)

—
.19 (.40)

.11 (.50)
.25 (.43)

Note. All conditions involve outcome variance with losses-and-gains prospects. Standard errors in parentheses. The mean
cooperation rate and standard error for the control condition (where no advice was provided) was .67 (.47).

public good contains a loss prospect, individuals are less likely
to contribute toward its provision. The presence of both outcome variance and social uncertainty pose a dual-uncertainty
problem for organizations attempting to provide public goods
through prosocial behavior. We extend previous research by
showing how advice from third-party experts can reduce uncertainty about the value of the public good and uncertainty about
the future behavior of others involved in the public goods
dilemma (Experiment 1). However, although third-party advice
can influence cooperative behavior through increasing trust
among group members, the uniformity of the valence of advice
significantly affects cooperative behavior through trust in the
advisory system. This negative effect occurs because individuals lose trust in their fellow group members, and, fearing
others think as they do, defect defensively. However, as shown
in Experiment 2, the psychological path to cooperation when
both advisors are unanimous is different from when they are
mixed (with two advisors). When both advisors are unanimous,
trust in fellow group members becomes the causal mechanism.
Experiment 3 expanded on this, finding that outlying opinions
are discounted, resulting in individuals trusting in their group
members and cooperating just as much as when the advisors’
estimates are unanimous.

Theoretical and Managerial Implications
The current findings push our understanding of public goods
dilemmas and advice taking in several ways. First, advice
provided by third-party experts represents a dual-uncertainty
reducing mechanism. Previous research focuses on how various
unilateral and joint interventions influence cooperation through
mitigating social uncertainty (Messick & Brewer, 1983), with
more than a decade of requests from scholars to find ways to
reduce environmental uncertainty (Gärling et al., 1998). The
current article investigates at least one way to reduce both
sources of uncertainty: advice from third-party experts. Facing
environmental uncertainty, individuals are susceptible to social
influence, and advice provided by perceived experts can influence an individual’s perceptions about others’ intentions and the
possible value of the public good.

A second insight is in bridging of advice-taking and smallgroups literatures. Previous research on advice taking examines
how advice is interpreted and used by groups, and these studies focus on how member suggestions are used to collectively
make estimates or decide a course of action (Davis, 1973).
To extend this work, Bonaccio and Dalal (2006) encouraged
applying the advice-taking literature to the small-group research
domain. The research reported in the current article applies
and empirically explores the psychology behind advice taking,
and how advice can influence conflict in small group social
dilemmas (Levine & Moreland, 1990). Specifically, third-party
advice can influence the interpersonal relations—specifically
group-member trust— thereby impacting voluntary cooperation
through reducing group conflict.
Our findings also hold implications for managing the provision of public goods. First, consider internal versus external
control of public good provision. Collectives often appoint a
leader, independent of the group, to help provide the public
good (De Cremer, 2007). Although this may appear as a sensible external control mechanism for facilitating public goods
provision, the appointment of a leader may raise concern among
group members losing control over their ability to choose
whether or not to invest, as the leader’s decision may conflict
with the wishes of the group members. Desiring to preserve
their control over their private property (i.e., private resources
they can choose contribute toward the public good or withhold),
individuals may be reluctant to use a leader (van Dijk, Wilke, &
Wit, 2003). In contrast, advice taking from third-party advisors
provides groups access to expertise and additional useful information while retaining control over deciding whether or not to
attempt collective action.
A second policy implication concerns our robust finding
between Experiments 2 and 3: If half of the advisors disagree,
then defection is greater than if no advice is provided. This
pattern was detected for both two and four advisors scenarios.
Although previous research focuses on how trust in an advisor influences the likelihood of following their advice (Sniezek
& Van Swol, 2001; Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005), the current
article shows at least one practical implication for why having
trust in advisors is important: In public goods dilemmas, individuals who receive both glad tidings and grave warnings from
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4 Unfavorable est.
vs. 0 favorable
est.
3 Unfavorable est.
vs. 1 favorable
est.
2 Unfavorable est.
vs. 2 favorable
est.
1 Unfavorable est.
vs. 3 favorable
est.
0 Unfavorable est.
vs. 4 favorable
est.
2 Unfavorable est.
vs. 0 favorable
est.
1 Unfavorable est.
vs. 1 favorable
est.
0 Unfavorable est.
vs. 2 favorable
est.
No advice (control
condition)

Condition

Estimate

4.61

4.47

3.37

4.66

—

1200

90

66

1575

—

3.66

1650

2.45

2.71

1824

33

4.31

—

(1.02)

(1.30)

(1.12)

(0.97)

(1.25)

(1.22)

(1.41)

(1.22)

—

1890

1875

15

1449

1800

48

72

30

—

4.66

3.65

4.45

4.57

4.39

3.57

4.22

4.12

Trust in
advisor

(SE)

Trust
in
advisor

21

Estimate

Advisor 2

Advisor 1

Panel A: Trust in advisors’ estimates

—

(1.02)

(1.39)

(1.14)

(0.96)

(1.03)

(1.15)

(1.12)

(1.34)

(SE)

—

—

—

—

1236

1500

54

99

18

Estimate

—

—

—

—

4.54

4.47

3.60

4.20

4.13

Trust in
advisor

Advisor 3

—

—

—

—

(0.97)

(1.04)

(1.17)

(1.07)

(1.29)

(SE)

TABLE 4
Mean-level trust in advisor estimates (est.) and group members in Experiment 3

—

—

—

—

1527

1740

1749

66

27

Estimate

—

—

—

—

4.47

4.40

3.69

4.11

4.24

Trust in
advisor

—

—

—

—

(1.00)

(1.02)

(1.22)

(1.10)

(1.22)

(SE)

(Continued)

Advisor 4

17

Mean
3.44
3.51
3.81
4.41
4.53
3.42
3.82
4.53
3.92

Condition
4 Unfavorable est. vs. 0 favorable est.
3 Unfavorable est. vs. 1 favorable est.
2 Unfavorable est. vs. 2 favorable est.
1 Unfavorable est. vs. 3 favorable est.
0 Unfavorable est. vs. 4 favorable est.
2 Unfavorable est. vs. 0 favorable est.
1 Unfavorable est. vs. 1 favorable est.
0 Unfavorable est. vs. 2 favorable est.
No advice given (control)

Panel B: Trust in fellow group members’ likelihood of cooperating

TABLE 4
(Continued)
Mean-level trust in advisor estimates (est.) and group members in Experiment 3

(0.94)
(0.93)
(1.02)
(0.89)
(0.98)
(0.96)
(0.96)
(0.95)
(1.11)

(SE)
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advisors cooperate less than if they receive no advice at all. This
may have been found because the outcome variance and social
uncertainty when combined with the mixed advisor estimates
creates too much uncertainty, resulting in people maintaining
the status quo of keeping their property rights (Babbit, 2002).

Limitations, Future Research Directions, and Conclusion
The current article’s findings lead to several questions for
future research. First consider the trans-paradigmatic question: What are the differences in effects that third-party advice
has on cooperation in public good dilemmas compared to
common-pool resource dilemmas when the resource is uncertain? This latter social-dilemma scenario is well studied in the
current literature (e.g., Gärling et al., 1998; Gustafsson, Biel,
& Gärling, 1999; Gustafsson, Eek, & Gärling, 2004; Messick
et al., 1988; Rapoport, Budescu, Suleiman, & Weg, 1992;
Suleiman, Rapoport, & Budescu, 1996). Similar to the current
article’s findings, research on common-pool resource dilemmas
with uncertain pool size finds that defection (or overharvesting)
is greater when the size of the common-pool resource is uncertain compared to certain. This finding is attributed to either
motivational biases (i.e., an individual is motivated to believe
the resource pool is large because it justifies taking more or the
individual “wishfully thinks” the resource is larger because a
larger resource is more desirable than a small one [Gustafsson
et al., 1999]) or a perceptual bias: Individuals believe that the
variance of the resource and the central tendency of the actual
size of the resource are correlated (Rapoport et al., 1992).
It could be that third-party advice about the size of the commons
would reduce wishful thinking and keep individuals from confusing central tendency with variance while having little effect
on egoistic motivations.7 Indeed, individuals often fall victim to
motivated blindness: They avoid seeing and using information
that would not assist in meeting their interests (Gino, Moore, &
Bazerman, 2009). Perhaps third-party advice warning that the
commons is very limited would fall on deaf ears?
Of course, the motivation to ignore advice is different for
contributors compared with takers from a shared resource.
Those asked to contribute to shared resource of unknown value
are motivated to believe the public good will yield little benefit, thereby justifying undercontribution. Comparatively, those
wanting to harvest from a commons are motivated to believe
there is plenty and to spare, thereby justifying harvesting more.
This distinction may become a source of conflict, considering
that many resource management problems—for example, food
banks and micro-credit lending—involve parties who give to
sustain a shared resource and also parties who take to use the
shared resource (Budescu & McCarter, 2012). Future research
may benefit from investigating how third-party advice affects
social welfare in such (understudied) give-or-take-some dilemmas, where such advice may be not only about what the value of
cooperation is but also about who should give and who should
take (McCarter, Budescu, & Scheffran, 2011).

A third extension involves the decision maker’s trust in
advisors. Complementing Sniezek and Van Swol’s work on
trust between judges and advisors (Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001;
Van Swol & Sniezek, 2005), the current article shows how
mixed signals from advisors crater judge’s trust. However, the
current article’s single-item measure of advisor trust leaves
open the question, “What is it that judges don’t trust about
mixed-signaling advisors?” Hardin (1993) and Malhotra and
Lumineau (2011) remind us that there is a difference between
trusting a person’s ability and trusting a person’s intentions.
Future research may benefit in examining whether it be ability or intentions that judges doubt when mixed estimates are
advised.
In summary, we investigated how advice from third-party
experts, as a form of informational social influence, impacts
cooperation in public goods dilemmas where the value of the
public good is unknown prior to provision. Although they interpret favorable estimates from third-party experts as glad tidings,
individuals view mixed and negative estimates as grave warnings, discouraging cooperation and the provision of the public
good by undermining trust.
NOTES
1. Ostrom (2003) also submits reputation as an antecedent to cooperation
in social dilemmas. However, reputation is not germane to the current article
because reputation in social dilemmas either (a) is equated to an individual’s
decision history (known to others) in a repeated social dilemma setting or (b) is
carried over from one social dilemma context to another. In the current article, the individuals play one-shot social dilemmas where their identities are
anonymous and do not receive feedback of their partners’ decision. Thus, reputation presently does not apply to the current investigation because there is
neither repeated interaction nor opportunity for an individual to know his or her
partner’s previous behavior.
2. The psychological approach to trust complements other conceptualizations such as the behavioral view of trust in political science and economics.
The similarity among these approaches is that trust entails some element of risk
and that trustworthiness is a personal characteristic that is developed through
reputation (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995; Ostrom, 2003). Further, both perspectives
view trust as having the elements of benevolence (e.g., good motives and intentions) and expectations (e.g., Hardin, 2002; Mayer et al., 1995). One way that
the psychological approach to trust differs from the behavioral view is in how
trust is measured: The latter views trust as a behavioral manifestation, while the
former views trust as a psychological state, relying on survey/scale items that
are intended to tap into the subfactors (e.g., shared expectations and values) of
the trust construct (for a review comparing these approaches to trust see Lewicki
et al., 2006).
3. A “prototypical” JAS study involves both the advisor and judge being
participants in the experiment: Both advisors and judges may vary in decisions
and are often subject to experimental treatment effects (for a review of this
paradigm and its variants see Bonaccio & Dahal, 2006). The current article uses
a variation of JAS: Only the judges (those receiving advice) are participants in
the experiment, and the advisors’ estimates (which were calculated previously)
are held constant across their respective treatments.
4. The term “trust social dilemma” was pioneered by Liebrand (1983) and
is paradigmatically different from other mixed-motive games—such as the trust
(or investment) dilemma game (e.g., Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). See
Chaudhuri (2009) for discussions about both paradigms.
5. Cooperation did not significantly change between the uncertain gainsonly prospect condition (M = 79%, SD = 0.41) and the certain condition (M =
88%, SD = 0.32); χ 2 1 = 2.86, n.s., but did significantly change between the
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loss-and-gain prospects condition (M = 67%, SD = 0.47) and the gains-only
prospects conditions (M = 84%, SD = 0.37); χ 2 1 = 14.26, p < .01. In addition,
the valence of the advisor’s outcome estimate significantly affected cooperation
behavior. A positive outcome estimate significantly increased cooperation (M =
96%, SD = 0.20) compared to when no advice was provided (M = 67%, SD =
0.47): χ 2 1 = 23.52, p < .01; and a negative outcome estimate significantly
decreased cooperation (M = 36%, SD = 0.48) compared to when no advice
was given: χ 2 1 = 20.66, p < .01. Lastly, a mediation analysis found that trust in
fellow group members fully mediated the relationship between estimate valence
(from one advisor) and the likelihood of cooperating; favorable estimate, z =
2.75, p < .05, and unfavorable estimate, z = –3.96, p < .05. These findings are
consistent with the results of Experiment 1 and suggest that the results are not
dependent on the particular method we employed.
6. Cooperation rates were significantly less when advisors provided twoadvisor, mixed-outcome valence estimates (M = 53%, SD = 0.50) compared to
when both estimates were favorable (M = 96%, SD = 0.21); χ 2 1 = 28.57, p <
.01. Further, a three-step mediation analysis found that trust in the experts’ estimates mediated the relationship between the distribution of valence estimates
and trust that their group members will cooperate; z = 4.40, p < .05 (Kenny
et al., 1998). We also replicated several supplemental findings of Experiment
2. We first conducted Pearson correlations of trust in Advisor 1’s estimate with
Advisor 2’s estimate for the three dual-advisor conditions. Although the correlations for dual favorable and dual unfavorable conditions were significant—both
r’s > 0.80, both p’s < .01—the correlation for the mixed condition was not; r =
0.21, n.s. Therefore, we compared trust in the estimates at the individual advisor
level (e.g., comparing trust in Advisor 1’s estimates across the three dualadvisor conditions). A repeated-measures ANOVA found that trust in Advisor
1’s estimate was not significantly different when comparing dual favorable condition (M = 4.66, SD = 1.02) and dual unfavorable condition (M = 4.47, SD
= 1.12); F 1, 88 = 3.05, n.s., but was significantly different when comparing the
mixed condition (M = 3.73, SD = 1.30) to either the favorable or unfavorable
conditions; both F’s1, 88 > 26.00, both p’s < .01. These effects were also found
for trust in Advisor 2’s estimates: Trust in Advisor 2’s estimate was not significantly different when comparing dual favorable condition (M 4.66, SD =
1.02) and dual unfavorable condition (M = 4.45, SD = 1.14); F1, 88 = 3.61,
n.s., but was significantly different when comparing the mixed condition (M =
3.73, SD = 1.30) to either the favorable or unfavorable conditions; both F’s1, 88
> 25.00, both p’s < .01. Trust in fellow group members was lower when both
experts provided unfavorable advice (M = 3.42, SD = 0.96) compared to when
no advice was provided (M = 3.92, SD = 1.11); F 1,88 = 22.36, p < .01, and
trust in fellow group members was higher when both experts provided favorable
advice (M = 4.52, SD = 0.95) compared to when no advice was provided (M =
3.98); F 1,88 = 35.45, p < .01. Lastly, there was significantly less trust in group
members when both experts gave unfavorable estimates compared to when the
estimates were both favorable; F 1, 88 = 142.24, p < .01.
7. We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this transparadigmatic question to our attention.
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